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Global economic history: a survey
Abstract: This text provides an overview of developments in global economic 
history since World War II. It focuses on two debates: the one on the Great 
Divergence and the one on character and history of economic globalisation. 
It starts with discussing what has long been the mainstream explanation 
of ‘the rise of the West’ and ‘the failure of the Rest’: the claim that, in the 
West, because of exceptional societal preconditions, a market economy could 
emerge. It then discusses alternative explanations for the rise of the West, like 
dependency theory and world-systems analysis, that put more emphasis on 
its exploitative relations with the rest of the world. The analysis of the debate 
on the Great Divergence is concluded with a brief presentation of the point 
of view of the so-called California School that denies Western exceptionalism 
and claims that the economies of, in particular, Eastern Asia in the early mod-
ern era were just as developed as those in the West. They regard ‘the rise of the 
West’ as a fairly late, fairly sudden and fairly contingent development. One 
of the main driving forces behind the current increase in interest for global 
economic history is the fascination with ‘globalisation’. Connections between 
various parts of the world of course always played a big part in the debates on 
the Great Divergence. In the last section of the article they are, however, also, 
briefly, discussed separately and in somewhat more general terms.
Key Words: Rise of the West, Great Divergence, world-systems analysis, Cali-
fornia School, economic globalisation
This survey will cover the historiography of global economic development from 
1945 onwards. It focuses on comparisons of and connections between the main 
civilizations on the globe. Eurasia, where between seventy to almost ninety per cent 
of global population has been living during the last millennium, will get most of the 
attention. The Americas and Africa, continents whose economies, relatively speak-
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ing, often were more integrated into global networks than those of Eurasia, will of 
course not be ignored. 
It will not present a chronological story littered with names of authors and titles, 
but rather a cursory exposition of the main views on global economic development, 
with a clear emphasis on the early modern era and the beginning of the modern era, 
indicating the main changes in those views. The focus will be on two debates that 
have dominated the research agenda of scholars in the field. The first one concerns 
the question why some countries have become rich whereas so many others have 
continued to be poor, or to put it in Kenneth Pomeranz’s terms, the question of the 
Great Divergence.1 The focus here will be almost exclusively on the early modern 
period, including the long nineteenth century. The second one concerns the history 
of intercontinental economic connections. It is usually referred to as the debate on 
(economic) globalization. My survey of this debate also, explicitly, is not meant as 
an exhaustive overview of what is and has been going on in this enormous field: 
developments after World War II will not be discussed. Although analytically sepa-
rate, in practice, these debates often are interconnected. To a large extent that will 
also be the case in this text. In them, one permanently comes across certain views on 
how economies are supposed to develop. Those will be introduced before we start 
our actual review. Annotation will be relatively sober, only referring to fundamental, 
classic texts or to texts that provide lots of up-to-date information and references. 
Obviously, references will also be provided in cases where I quote or strongly para-
phrase. For scholars who are mentioned in the text and who are no longer alive, 
years of birth and death will be provided.
Perspectives on economic development 
Up until quite recently, two perspectives almost monopolized thinking about 
macro-economic, long-term development. They functioned as explanatory frame-
work and theoretical scaffolding for almost all master-narratives in global economic 
history. For the sake of convenience, they will be called ‘Smithian’ and ‘Marxian’. 
They originated in the West, but were taken up by many people elsewhere. In so-
called under-developed or developing countries most ‘modernizers’, for example, 
also were Smithians or Marxians.2 
The first perspective is called after Adam Smith (1723–1790) and covers the 
views of all those who regard the market mechanism as the necessary and even 
sufficient condition for economic development. This mechanism is supposed to 
function optimally in what is nowadays often called a ‘market economy’, but that 
especially in more ideological times was known as ‘capitalism’. That is characterised 
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by the juridical protection of private property and private enterprise, the possibil-
ity to acquire goods and services on a market, and by the principle of free and fair 
competition. For Smithians, capitalism first and foremost is characterised by eco-
nomic freedom and formal equality of those participating in market exchange. In a 
capitalist system, individuals can pursue their interests, while, if they act rationally, 
at the same time maximizing societal wealth. When it comes to explaining the Great 
Divergence, internal developments hold pride of place, amongst Smithians. The 
contribution of the rest of the world to Western primacy in any case is presented as 
rather marginal. The label ‘Smithian’ is a broad one. The institutionalist approach 
that recently has become quite influential, is also regarded as Smithian here, as it 
refines but never rejects the basic premises of Smith’s thinking. 
The second perspective is called ‘Marxian’, because it has been inspired by Karl 
Marx’s (1818–1883) ideas on economic development. This perspective too is not 
monolithic and static. It has a certain ‘core’ though that justifies using one over-
arching concept. The Marxian answer to the question what is distinctive for the 
economies of the West and what caused them to grow also is: capitalism. But for 
Marxians there is more to capitalism than markets and rational individuals making 
choices. They regard it first and foremost as a mode of production with an unequal 
distribution of power and of the means of production over classes. They are serious 
about practicing political economy and unwilling to ignore the role of collusion, 
coercion and monopoly in capitalist development. They agree that in capitalism 
total production will increase, but at the cost of growing inequality. In explaining 
the emergence of capitalism, classical Marxism too emphasises internal develop-
ments in certain Western societies without, however, entirely ignoring the impor-
tance of the rest of the world. Its rather dispersed comments on that importance 
have been systematised and elaborated upon by proponents of what has become 
known as ‘dependency theory’ and ‘world-systems analysis’. These, of course, will 
be discussed here. 
Both Smithians and Marxians think of industrialization as a major shift in West-
ern economic history. In the end, however, they see it as ‘just’ an acceleration in a 
continuing process. For modern Smithians industrialization is a continuation of the 
process of mercantile development, the result of intensified competition ‘provoking’ 
technological invention. The Industrial Revolution in Britain in this view is just a 
new phase in a process that had been going on for a long time, as Arnold Toynbee, 
who introduced the term ‘Industrial Revolution’ into serious scholarship, implied 
when he wrote that “[…] the essence of the Industrial Revolution is the substitution 
of competition for the medieval regulations which had previously controlled the 
production and distribution of wealth.”3 Adam Smith himself and many of his fel-
low classical economists, would be surprised by this interpretation. They regarded 
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sustained and substantial growth, i.e. modern economic growth as it emerged with 
the Industrial Revolution, as impossible.
How exactly the transition from feudalism to capitalism and then industrial 
capitalism was made continues to divide Marxians.4 While recognizing that mercan-
tile capitalism is fundamentally different from industrial capitalism, they as a rule 
claim that the former, somehow, produced the latter. Marx himself distinguishes 
between two routes in the transition to modern industry: the really revolutionary 
one, where the producer may become a merchant, and a second one in which the 
merchant takes over control over production.5 For him capitalism before industri-
alization is fundamentally different from industrial capitalism, but still the first one 
‘contains’ the second one. 
In the last decades, ideas about economic growth and development have become 
much more complex. Developmental economics has entered a phase of confusion. 
Historians studying economic development in the West have come up with so many 
new data and interpretations that the standard narratives have become highly prob-
lematic. In the emerging discipline of ‘global economic history’ traditional beliefs 
with regard to the economic history of ‘the Rest’ as well as ‘the West’ are put to the 
test. These recent developments will be addressed. The text will conclude with some 
separate comments on economic globalisation.
The role of geography 
All this does not mean that all explanations of global differences in wealth have 
always been part and parcel of watertight ‘economic’ explanations. There have 
always been scholars who, in a context of showing European exceptionalism, 
referred to natural conditions. Let us first, before continuing our analysis of Smi-
thian and Marxian approaches, comment on them. One finds many references to 
environmental factors in the highly influential book by Eric L. Jones on the Euro-
pean miracle.6 They are not absent in David Landes’ blockbuster either.7 But they 
are also present in the work of authors with completely different backgrounds like 
David Cosandey or Hubert Kiesewetter.8 Somewhat surprisingly, one of their fiercest 
opponents actually is the geographer James M. Blaut (1927–2000), who does us the 
favour of collecting references to geography in the literature, to then try and refute 
them.9 References to Europe’s geographical ‘extras’ have always been stock in trade, 
and received an extra boost from the enormous success of Jared Diamond’s, Guns, 
germs and steel, a highly influential book, that brings many classical arguments 
together, and whose main thesis verges on geographical determinism.10 Diamond 
explicitly wants to bring across the message that there is nothing specific about the 
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people of Eurasia: their advantage over others simply is a geographical windfall. To 
suggest that the rich are richer because they somehow are superior would be racism. 
Eurasia’s luck was that it had many animals that could be domesticated, and a more 
variegated flora and fauna, in combination with easy patterns of diffusion. 
In much of this literature Western Europe is presented as exceptionally lucky. 
With its rainfall agriculture, it had no need for a ‘hydraulic state’. Waterways as a rule 
never were far away, so transport was cheap. The Americas were not that distant. 
So it was fairly easy for Europeans to discover them. West Africa was even closer to 
them, but it had no seafaring tradition. The fact that the inhabitants of the New 
World massively fell victim to diseases imported by the Europeans made it easy to 
conquer their land. As compared to many inhabitants of the earth, in this case in 
particular Asians, Europeans were less struck by disaster and diseases. When disas-
ters hit, they hit people rather than infrastructure. Europe’s landscape was highly 
diversified, as were its climate, flora, and fauna. It was also very fragmented, geo-
graphically as well as politically. It had many separate concentrations of population, 
resources and power. That was positive for exchange and made it hard for intruders 
to conquer it in a one-off campaign. 
The comments that over the years have been made with regard to the geographi-
cal disadvantages of ‘the Rest’ are so diverse, and sometimes even so contradictory, 
that one is tempted to say that the problem of its geography is simply that it is not 
like Europe’s. It was not favoured by its flora, fauna or immunity to certain diseases. 
According to various authors, most recently Charles Mann, the Americas, espe-
cially the later Latin America, before 1492, were home to various highly developed 
and densely populated societies.11 That, however, changed dramatically in a short 
period of time. The diseases the European conquerors brought with them almost 
completely wiped out the native population. Those who survived were turned into 
subjects of the European conquerors who ‘restructured’ their society and economy. 
The northern half of the continent had the luck that there was not much the Euro-
peans could plunder, so that a new society could be created there that was much 
less based on extraction and coercion. Reading comments on Africa one can only 
conclude that nature gave that continent a bad deal. It often appears as a nasty, 
tropical continent, which is extremely unhealthy, too hot to work hard, and not very 
suited for agriculture. The extent to which these statements are based on quite wild 
generalizations, among other things, shows in the fact that one can also come across 
claims that Africa’s problem would be that its tropical climate is so bountiful. 
For Asia one often finds references to those varieties of its agriculture that need 
irrigation and therefore, according at least to a line of reasoning that has been quite 
influential, ended up with so-called ‘hydraulic states’.12 This is not the only way in 
which irrigated agriculture, in this case especially rice agriculture, was presented as 
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to, in the end, have had unwanted consequences for the economy as a whole. It’s 
very high land productivity could sustain large populations and high population 
growth, and could so become a curse in disguise as this might easily lead to ‘involu-
tion’, a situation of decreasing returns to labour without people leaving the land to 
look for a full job outside agriculture. Moreover, for quite some time, revolutionary 
changes in this kind of agriculture, comparable to mechanization and the extensive 
use of artificial fertiliser that led to a revolution in Western agriculture, were not 
possible. They had to wait until the so-called ‘green revolution’ after the Second 
World War.13 
In current global economic history references to the environment have again 
become very popular.14 Especially amongst scholars who flaunt their anti-Euro-
centrism, there is a clear preference to focus on Europe’s ‘fortunate’ geographical 
circumstances and, more in general, on ‘luck’, and much less on its institutions, 
when it comes to explaining the rise of the West. In Pomeranz’s highly influential 
explanation of the Great Divergence, Britain could become the first industrial 
nation as it managed to escape from Malthusian constraints via coal and colonies 
that both, according to him at least, provided the country in a fairly contingent, for-
tunate way with an enormous amount of ghost acreage.15 Jones had already pointed 
at ‘the windfall’ of extra land the Europeans acquired thanks to their discoveries.16 
In Andre Gunder Frank’s Reorient, factor endowments, resources and population 
hold centre stage in his global ‘economic-demographic model’ for explaining ‘the 
fall of the East’ and the ‘rise of the West’.17 Marks presents his story on the origins 
of the modern world as a global and ecological narrative and in doing that is fond 
of referring to contingency and luck.18 Hobson, in his latest book, emphasises that 
Europeans were lucky no less than five times in their rise.19 Not all of these com-
ments seem to be very helpful. It is quite clear that what in the long run matters if 
one wants sustained and sustainable economic growth, are increasing productivity 
and a continuous flow of innovations, not simple accumulation.
Interesting debates have been waged about whether geography or institutions 
should be seen as fundamental causes of long-run growth.20 As usual in history a 
combination would be preferable, like the approach we find in the book by Mike 
Davis on El Niño famines and the making of the modern world, an analysis that deals 
with central issues in the Great Divergence-debate.21 
The Smithian paradigm
Let us return to the main lines of thought with regard to economic development 
and have a closer look at the Smithian approach. It has become part and parcel of 
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‘neoclassical economics’. That perspective has been so overwhelmingly dominant 
in economic thinking that it could not fail to influence the discipline of economic 
history. As a rule, it did not do so by way of historical analyses. Neoclassical profes-
sional economists never tended to do much historical analysis, let alone long-term 
historical analysis. But their discipline provided such a rigorous, refined and ‘obvi-
ous’ system of thought, that economic historians or economists acting as such, 
could always fall back on its ‘proven’ principles when they were in need of an expla-
nation. From the days of Adam Smith to the so-called “Washington Consensus”, as 
it was formulated in circles of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank 
in the 1990s, the basic message has remained the same: installing and maintaining 
a market economy with free and fair competition would be the most effective and 
efficient way to create economic growth. 
For neoclassical economists explaining the ‘rise of the West’ is quite simple: 
basically it coincides with ‘the rise of the market’. Explaining the ‘failure’ of ‘the 
Rest’ is not complicated either. There, apparently, well-functioning markets did not 
emerge. From Adam Smith onwards, (neo-)classical economists spent most of their 
time specifying and refining their claims without changing their basic message: 
economic theory proves that nothing can beat the market in generating economic 
growth, and economic history shows that countries with a market-economy have 
been and are the most successful ones. Britain was the first, and for quite some time, 
only industrial nation, and it was the place where Adam Smith wrote his works 
and found staunch support. The United States were Britain’s successor as a global 
economic superpower and they too emphatically claimed to be a market economy. 
What better proof could one wish for?
Economic historians departing from a Smithian perspective as a rule were seri-
ous and good historians. They could not fail to see the differences between various 
Western countries and the ways in which they industrialized. They nevertheless 
often tended to write their How the West grew rich-stories in terms of a ‘model’, in 
which developing an economy and industrialising it in the end meant creating a 
market economy and in which all other strategies were doomed to fail, apparent 
successes only being temporary and, quite often, illusionary. The highly respected 
economist, turned economic historian, John Hicks (1904–1989) proposed a theory 
of economic history in this vein.22 Walt Rostow (1916–2003) postulated the exis-
tence of stages of economic growth.23 They both did this on largely Smithian prem-
ises. The two most popular books on the rise of the West and the poverty of the Rest 
of the last half century, the one by Eric Jones on the European miracle and the one 
by David Landes on the wealth and poverty of nations, both claim that what in the 
end made ‘the West’ rise and was lacking or functioning less well in ‘the Rest’, were 
well-functioning ‘markets’.24 
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Of course, differences of emphasis, often substantial, have always existed bet-
ween scholars who have here been lumped together under the label ‘Smithian’. An 
approach that has become very important in the field of economic history from 
the 1970s onwards is institutional economics. What differentiates institutionalists 
from ‘ordinary’ neo-classical economists, is that they are keen on focusing on, and 
determining the institutions, i.e. the formal and informal rules of economic life, that 
ensure that markets function as efficiently as possible.25 
Historical research inspired by them tends to focus on the evolution of property 
rights and the ways in which they are defined and guaranteed. The role of the state 
in this respect is paramount. So institutionalists have written numerous studies on 
‘good governance’ and how that does – or more often does not! – emerge. Douglass 
North, the most famous institutionalist, has published extensively on the history of 
Britain, the first major country, so he claims, with the ‘right’ institutions.26 He has 
also explicitly, with Robert Thomas, tackled the problem of the rise of the Western 
world.27 Although they only discuss the situation in parts of Western Europe in the 
early modern era, they conclude that the explanation of that rise consists in the 
way in which property rights became defined and protected, in particular in Britain 
after the Glorious Revolution, and simply take it as a fact that the rest of the world 
must have lacked that kind of property rights. This has continued to be a very 
popular view. Basically Hernando De Soto, for example, just repeated this message 
in his analysis why, according to him, capitalism triumphed in the West and failed 
everywhere else.28
Preconditions for capitalism: enter Max Weber 
If capitalism is the solution, then finding out what kind of society could give birth 
to it becomes the question. A capitalist market economy in which the market func-
tions, by and large, according to its own autonomous logic can only exist in a very 
specific socio-political and cultural environment. Karl Polanyi (1886–1964) cer-
tainly was correct, when in his The great transformation he claimed that what Smith 
called “the propensity in human nature […] to truck barter and exchange one thing 
for another”29 was not quite as natural as the father of modern economics claimed. 
What we call ‘economics’, as a rule was embedded in social relationships. To think 
of all consumer goods, but even more land, labour, and money, as mere commodi-
ties, or to, for example, try and completely separate household from firm, as would 
be ‘rational’ in a capitalist society, implies a revolutionary break with tradition, like 
the one in Britain in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that Polanyi analysed 
in his book.30 
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In the neo-classical interpretation of economic development, making ‘the eco-
nomic’ an autonomous sphere of life boils down to removing all obstacles that 
prevent people from acting as homines oeconomici. That removal is both necessary 
and positive. If actors are rational and can take care of their own business, growth 
will appear to be something quite normal. Adam Smith was explicit in that respect: 
“Little else is requisite to carry a state to the highest degree of opulence from the 
lowest barbarism, but peace, easy taxes, and a tolerable administration of justice; all 
the rest being brought about by the natural course of things.”31 The number of pos-
sible impediments to an autonomous functioning of the economy is huge. The most 
important one on the level of entire societies would probably be what economists 
call ‘rent-seeking’. The economic historian Eric Jones, to whom we already referred, 
in a book called Growth recurring, went as far as regarding economic history as fun-
damentally a struggle between a propensity for growth and one for rent-seeking.32 
This quest for the specific set of social arrangements in which economic life 
can become less embedded in social arrangements has resulted in a wide-ranging 
catalogue of characteristics that are supposed to differentiate the modern, capitalist 
West from its pre-modern past and even more from all non-Western societies that 
would have continued to be ‘traditional’. Most of the characteristics that one finds 
in the vast literature can already be found in Max Weber’s (1864–1920) work.33 In 
the enormous amount of literature on ‘the rise of the West’, for a very long time, a 
combined Smithian-Weberian paradigm has been dominant.34 In briefly summariz-
ing Weber’s ideas on the ‘peculiarity of the West’, one can still provide a synthesis 
of almost all the themes discussed in the bulk of non-Marxian literature published 
until as late as the 1990s.  
For Weber the Western world had several distinctive characteristics. In the last 
instance they are all emanations of the fundamental and long process of rationalisa-
tion or ‘disenchantment’ that he thought characterised Western society. Capitalism as 
a system in which private entrepreneurs seek profit via peaceful exchange on a market 
requires systematic rational acting. Rationality is a broad and not exactly unequivocal 
concept. But it is obvious that without e.g. methodical and systematic measurement 
and calculation, one cannot be an efficient, let alone a successful entrepreneur in a 
capitalist environment. To turn capitalism into a successful system, such ‘rationalisa-
tion’ has to pervade the entire political, social and cultural life of a society.
The kind of state that evolved in the West and that is supposed to be the ideal 
counterpart of a capitalist economy is normally described, in Weberian terms, as 
‘rational-legal’ and ‘bureaucratic’. It acts in a predictable way, is bound by its own 
rules, and trustworthy. There are clear limits to its arbitrariness. It is, however, very 
powerful as it can get things done, especially when people look at government as 
theirs. The emergence of capitalism has also often been connected to certain ‘ratio-
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nal’ characteristics of social life in the West: individualism, a central role for the 
nuclear family, a tendency to separate household and firm, and a specific kind of 
demographic behaviour, epitomised in the so-called ‘European marriage pattern’, 
in which people marry late and many never marry at all.35 References to a uniquely 
high level of social and geographical mobility also have always been very popular, as 
was pointing at the fact that in Western Europe the bourgeoisie acquired substan-
tial political leverage. With regard to their geographical mobility, it is claimed that 
Europeans were explorers par excellence, which resulted in the acquisition of new 
markets, new institutions and new knowledge.
Rationality was also supposed to increasingly dominate Western culture. Here 
references abounded to the fact that the Western mind would be inquisitive and 
interested in tinkering with nature and society. This did not mean that the West had 
always been number one in theoretical knowledge, let alone technology. It did, how-
ever, so it was claimed, become the place, where invention and inventors were sup-
ported or at least protected, and where inquiry became autonomous and methodical. 
So in the end, because of its cultivation of invention, or, as it has been called “the 
invention of invention”,36 its science and technology could and would flourish. 
Western Europe has been a Christian civilisation for many centuries. So it is 
almost inevitable that scholars would try and connect the Christian faith, or a 
specific variety of it, to Europe’s particular history. When it comes to economic his-
tory, the first ‘connection’ that springs to mind is the one made by Weber between 
the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism. Linking Catholicism, a much less 
disenchanted religion, to economic modernity proved more of a challenge. It nev-
ertheless has been tried by pointing at the fact that in Catholicism God is supposed 
to have created an orderly world that is subject to laws and that man is allowed to 
dominate. Much more straightforward connections would be that the organisation 
of its cloisters was an adumbration of later factories; that it had supported and legit-
imized what is nowadays regarded as modern marriage; or that it had functioned as 
a provider of trust between Westerners.
Underlying all these characteristics, and therefore in many publications pre-
sented as the ultimate cause of European dynamism, would have been the fact 
that the sources of social power, to put it in Michael Mann’s terms, to wit political, 
ideological, economic and military power, were never monopolized by one central 
instance.37 Most people in Western Europe enjoyed a relatively high level of freedom 
and protection. On the other hand they were subject to a fairly intense level of com-
petition. This competition also characterised the inter-state level. Western Europe 
never again became (part of) an empire. It continued to be a system of competing 
states. This, so it is claimed, prevented the region from entering a phase of stasis that 
often is regarded as the final fate of all empires.38 
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The ‘failure of the Rest’, according to Smithians and Weberians
Most Smithian/Weberian explanations of the economic predicament in which the 
non-West ended up, boil down to the claim that there impediments to growth had 
not been removed. Explanations in terms of geography and contingency have not 
been lacking, but most authors have emphasized that rulers and systems of rule 
outside the West were, almost without exception, not exactly helpful in generating 
economic growth. Governments of the big empires in ‘the East’ tend to be described 
as ‘plunder machines’ or ‘revenue pumps’; their rulers as inefficient, living in luxury 
and wasting resources. Their realms are characterised by exploitation, insecure 
property, and, as a consequence, a tendency of subjects to hoard and hide their 
wealth. So read the general Smithian view. When research showed that a number of 
emperors in the eighteenth century ruled China very lightly instead of despotically, 
it read that their empire suffered from ‘under-government’ and ‘lethargic’ rule. 
Outside Asia the situation was no better. The rulers of the Maya’s, Aztecs or 
Inca’s also were depicted as brute exploiters. The press of African rulers was not 
good either. It is claimed that in pre-colonial times, Africa, overall, did not really 
have states. With colonialism Western state-models were introduced, with fairly 
unfortunate results, in particular after the colonialists disappeared. The continent 
in any case never became known for good governance. The completely different 
developments in North as compared to South America looked ideally suited to illus-
trate the importance of having the right, meaning Anglo-Saxon, institutions. North 
America inherited its institutions from the British and became rich. Most of South 
and Central America inherited the wrong institutions from Spain and Portugal, and 
became poor. Whatever rulers outside the West may have or have not done their rule 
was considered arbitrary and they could not be held accountable. That was widely 
regarded as bad for development.
Comments with regard to what was wrong in ‘the Rest’ were not confined to 
politics. It would be hard to find a description of, for example, China that did 
not mention over-population. Claims have always abounded in the literature that 
many societies across the globe were better at reproducing than at producing, as a 
rule with quite unclear references with regard to time and place. Again, contrasts 
with the Western world were usually emphasized, like the tendency to marry (too) 
young and to have (too) many children. With regard to Africa, one finds comments 
that it would be too empty as well as comments that it would be too full. When 
discussing demography of ‘the Rest’, commentators also liked to refer to the fact 
that the structure of families ‘there’ was not as conducive to economic growth as 
the Western ‘individualistic’ nuclear family. Most people across the globe were con-
sidered to be too tightly encapsulated in extended families, clans, lineages or tribes, 
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to have the possibility – and feel the need and see the use – of personal initiative. 
The separation of household and firm, so dear to Smithians and Marxians alike, had 
not progressed very far, if at all. In areas of intensive agriculture, that could mean 
that the household-mode of production, quite common in traditional societies, 
perpetuated a system of self-exploitation and continued to be a serious obstacle to 
modern economic growth. 
When it comes to culture, again, various quite different factors were and often 
still are mentioned to explain why regions outside the West did not take-off. 
References to a defective work ethic and labour discipline have always been very 
popular39 – next to comments about self-exploitation! – as have comments on the 
negative role of various religions. Until Confucianism was regarded as one of the 
underlying causes of the ‘Asian miracle’ in the last decades of the twentieth century, 
its economic impact had been mostly regarded as negative: it inspired people to 
adapt to the world instead of changing it. Hinduism and Buddhism basically were 
regarded as systems of thought that are too ‘other-worldly’ and Islam as a religion 
that over the centuries developed into a conservative if not fundamentalist force. 
In many publications, moreover, civilizations in other parts of the world appeared 
as less ‘open’ than Western societies. In East Asia e.g. countries like China, Korea, 
and Japan for a long time made it all but impossible for foreigners to get in and for 
their own people to get out. Just like the big ‘Islamic’ empires of the Mughals, the 
Safavids and the Ottomans, they had no overseas empires. Not only, so it reads, did 
these countries often close their frontiers: they also closed their minds. This would 
in particular apply to China and many Islamic regions. Again, these comments were 
not just ‘Western prejudices’: by and large they were endorsed by many ‘non-West-
ern’ modernizers, whether they were liberal, socialist or nationalist. It is only fairly 
recently that Landes claimed that culture can make all the difference.40
The Marxian paradigm
The historiography of economic development has never been monolithic. Scholars 
writing in a Smithian vein stood opposite those who derived inspiration from Marx. 
Those taking care of Marx’s legacy have always been a contentious lot. But they have 
enough in common to be regarded as a group. As indicated, the rise of the West to 
economic primacy for Marxists too, basically, boils down to the rise of capitalism. In 
a certain way and to a certain extent, Marx was positive about that. He regarded cap-
italism as a necessary, progressive phase on the way to socialism that had to destroy 
the fetters of feudalism. The development of capitalism to him, basically, was the 
outcome of processes that take place inside certain Western societies, to then spread 
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over the globe. That went so fast that already in his days, capitalism had become a 
global phenomenon that could only be dealt with on a global scale. With regard to 
the question whether there would be a model of development, a march-route for all 
countries in the world, Marx and Marxians are ambivalent. Marx did indeed sug-
gest that the less developed countries could see in English social development “the 
image of (their) own future”, but elsewhere fiercely denied having produced a his-
torico-philosophical theory of general development, imposed by fate on all peoples, 
whatever the historical circumstances in which they are placed.41
For Marxians, a market economy and the behaviour it implies, is anything but 
natural. It arose at a certain moment in time and at a certain place. Most people 
would rather not be subjected to the permanent and fierce disciplining by the 
market. Those who became the actual labour force of the capitalist entrepreneurs, 
simply had to; they had no other option than to sell their labour as they had no, or 
insufficient means of subsistence. There resides the importance of expropriation, a 
concept that is central in the work of Marx and his followers. This expropriation 
did not occur without violence. Support of the state was paramount in wielding 
that violence.
In traditional economies, small owner-producers, who normally work as and in 
a household, play a predominant role. Capitalism and socialism can only emerge, 
when that is no longer the case. By far the largest group of those producers were peas-
ants. That means that, overall, in Marxist analysis and practice, creating a modern 
society involves getting rid of them and their household mode of production. Marx 
analysed this process for Britain and a neo-Marxist like Robert Brenner, a century 
later, basically still started from the same premises.42 Barrington Moore (1913–2005), 
in his extremely influential Social origins of dictatorship and democracy. Lord and 
peasant in the making of the modern world, elaborated on how this elimination, or its 
failure, worked out in various societies and showed that there have been more than 
one route to modern industrial society, not just the ‘classical’ capitalist one of Eng-
land.43 There also exists a fascist road to modern industrial society, exemplified by 
Germany and Japan, where initially peasants are not eliminated as a group but even 
courted and government is a major driving force of industrialization. Finally there is 
the communist route, exemplified by Russia and China, still pre-capitalist societies, 
where peasants in large masses supported the revolution against the Ancien Régime, 
to later on be deprived of their property as government tried to create a collectivised 
agricultural sector to feed a rapidly increasing urban population. 
Marx and his followers clearly were under the spell of the enormous dynamism 
and power of the capitalist West. When it comes to their perception of the rest of 
the world, they differ surprisingly little from Smithians. Just like them, and for 
similar reasons, they think that it lacked dynamism. Marx’s original comments are 
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not based on systematic comparative analysis and constitute only a tiny part of his 
oeuvre. Most of them are rather imprecise and refer to ‘the Orient’ or ‘Asia’. At vari-
ous occasions he calls them ‘unchanging’ and ‘unchangeable’ and claims the key to 
understanding their stasis is the absence of private property.44 For whatever exact 
reason: by and large, amongst Marxists the impression that the Orient was back-
ward and static stuck. Much of what Marx said about Asia in general was simply 
held to also apply to China. Karl Wittfogel (1896–1986) in his book on oriental 
despotism would later elaborate extensively on the Chinese case, in particular its 
totalitarian ‘hydraulic state’. 
In China itself, that concept never became really popular.45 The official inter-
pretation of history, as a rule, preferred to describe the situation before the opening 
by the West as ‘feudal’, allowing for ‘sprouts of capitalism’.46 These, however, could 
never come to full bloom because of intervention by the state and foreign imperi-
alists and because of the behaviour of local power-holders. As always in Marxian 
thinking, there is a certain ambivalence about the role of imperialists in the process 
of modernization. Whatever their wrong-doings, they did trigger the development 
of a kind of capitalism. Obviously, Chinese historians, living in a country run by a 
communist party, can not be expected to be very enthusiastic about China’s history 
before communist rule. In Japan there emerged and continued to exist a very influ-
ential Marxist interpretation of Japanese history, especially of its modernization.47 
In India, the influential Marxist interpretation of pre-colonial history propagated 
by the Aligarh School continued to regard the village community and in particular 
the extractive and oppressive Mughal state as major obstacles to the emergence of 
autonomous capitalism. With the coming of the colonisers, major changes did take 
place, but they of course were implemented in a colonial setting.48 Systematic analy-
sis along traditional Marxian lines of the Ottoman Empire, the other big Islamic 
Empire in the East, is as yet lacking. The situation in Latin America and Africa is 
never explicitly addressed in Marx’s work. As we will see later on, it does receive lots 
of attention in the work of many neo-Marxist scholars. 
Marxian off-shoots: primitive accumulation, dependency theory and 
world-systems analysis 
In the work of Marx and his followers, one can also discern an interpretation of the 
emergence of capitalism and the rise of the West in which pride of place is given to 
the way in which capitalist societies profit from their contacts with other societies. 
Basically there are two varieties of this approach. In the first one, the emphasis is 
on the role of non-European regions in ‘primitive accumulation’. Their exploitation 
147ÖZG 20.2009.2
here is part of the pre-history of real capitalism: it helps explaining how it all began. 
This interpretation differs from the one that originates with Lenin, Hobson and 
Hilferding, who wrote about imperialism as capitalism’s ‘highest stage’ in which a 
competitive, liberal capitalism is succeeded by an organised, ‘monopoly’ capitalism. 
In this view, it is only at that stage that other parts of the world become quintes-
sential for capitalist economies, with capitalists desperately looking around for 
markets, resources, and possibilities to invest. 
The thesis that the contribution of the Rest to the riches of the West, and the 
role of the West in the under-development of the Rest, were anything but marginal 
has never lacked defenders, especially outside the West. Eric Williams (1911–1981) 
wrote a very influential book on slavery in the Caribbean and the rise of capital-
ism.49 Its theses are still debated and even go through a revival.50 Walter Rodney 
(1942–1980) set out to explain how Europe underdeveloped Africa.51 Indian his-
torians with a nationalist background would always point at the ways in which the 
British plundered their country and continue the debate on the ‘drain of wealth’ as 
it was started by Dutt (1848–1909) already in the nineteenth century.52 In recent 
publications by e.g. James Blaut, the thesis that plunder and windfall profits were at 
the basis of Western dominance is still prominent.53 Frank and others like to point at 
the fact that without bullion Westerners would have had depressingly little to offer 
on Asian markets.54 
Latin American scholars like Raúl Prebish (1901–1986), Fernando Henrique 
Cardoso, and Theotonio Dos Santos have tried to turn the firm intuition that there 
is a connection between the wealth of the West and the poverty of the Rest into 
a theory called ‘dependency theory’. This ‘theory’ was formulated to explain the 
specific predicament of their continent.55 It was taken over by Andre Gunder Frank 
(1929–2005), very probably its best-known defender in the West.56 An important 
incentive for its proponents was the fact that in many of the countries they stud-
ied the impoverishment that had started in colonial times did not disappear after 
independence, notwithstanding the fact that those countries had become formally 
independent and more integrated into international markets. Apparently, so they 
claim, there exist mechanisms that prevent world-wide economic convergence and 
rather create divergence. Rich nations, or as they now were often called in their 
work, ‘the North’, in their role as ‘metropolis’, continued to be rich and became even 
richer, whereas poor nations, or ‘the South’, in their role as ‘satellites’, continued to 
be poor, if they did not actually become poorer. 
Direct exploitation of course continued to play a role, e.g. in the manipulation 
of trade by the North and collaborating elites in South, or in the repression of the 
labour force in poor countries. Even in formally independent countries, the use of 
brute force by local power holders and ‘Westerners’ never ceased to be a real threat. 
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Rich and poor countries were clearly distinct when it comes to the organisation 
of the labour market and the power of labour. What especially early dependency 
theorists were interested in, however, was more indirect, ‘structural’ exploitation. 
They liked to point at a division of labour between rich and poor countries that lay 
at the basis of what they call ‘unequal exchange’, with positive effects for the North 
and negative ones for the South. Poor countries, so they claimed, mainly exported 
primary commodities with terms of trade that structurally deteriorated. They were 
transformed into ‘dual economies’, with export sectors that had hardly any linkages 
with the rest of the economy, and whose profits were either transferred to the West 
or ended up in the hands of a tiny domestic elite. Instead of providing a solution, 
integration in wider markets so became the problem. It implied ‘the development 
of underdevelopment’. Thinking in terms of dependency became quite popular in 
various Third World countries, especially in Latin America.57 Its impact in the West 
was fairly minor. 
The ideas of Immanuel Wallerstein, that are very similar in principle, but sup-
ported by broader and systematic historical research, in contrast, had an enormous 
impact, in the West as well as in the rest of the world. His books about the modern 
world-system, the first of which came out in 1974, are amongst the most quoted 
in disciplines like history and the social sciences.58 In his historical analysis, he was 
strongly influenced by the French historian Fernand Braudel (1902–1985). For both 
Braudel and Wallerstein, again, ‘capitalism’ is at the root of Western wealth and 
predominance. For Braudel it is not as such a uniquely European phenomenon. 
He only claims that nowhere it developed as far as in Europe.59 For Wallerstein it 
is something uniquely European that emerged in the sixteenth century and then 
began to spread over the entire globe.
Both scholars explicitly define capitalism in terms that are very different from, 
and in many respects even opposed, to those used by Smith and Marx. For them it 
is not a system based on the working of free markets. Although it can only flour-
ish in societies that have markets, it is identical with a market economy as such. In 
those markets in which capitalists operate, competition is neither free nor fair, nor 
transparent. Protection, monopoly and manipulation rule supreme in a context 
of collusion between political power-holders and capitalists. Losses are absorbed 
by political hands while gains are distributed to private hands. The state provides 
shelter for capitalists, often against the market. The capitalists we are talking about 
here, felt at home in finance and long-distance trade. With the rise of the modern 
state and European overseas expansion, opportunities in those sectors increased. 
As a rule they did not invest heavily in production, least of all in agriculture. They 
preferred freedom of manoeuvre and the spreading of risks. All this hardly changed 
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with industrialization which therefore, both by Braudel and Wallerstein, is not 
regarded as a real break in the history of capitalism. 
Of fundamental importance in a survey like this is the fact that for both of 
them capitalism is a ‘world-system’ that implies a geographical hierarchy, i.e. a 
specific division of labour between what Wallerstein calls ‘the core’ region of the 
system and its ‘peripheries’ and ‘semi-peripheries’. It is a system because life in it 
is largely self-contained and the dynamics of its development are largely internal. 
It is a ‘world-system’, not because it encompasses the entire world, but because its 
economic logic operates within an area larger than that which any political entity 
can entirely control. By referring to that economic logic we have already pointed at 
its third characteristic: it is an economic system. In the core or centre, one finds free, 
highly-paid and specialised labour, working in sectors where value-adding is high. 
The periphery of a world-economy consists of that geographical sector of it that 
produces primarily lower-ranking goods and whose labour is less well rewarded. It 
is an integral part of the overall system because the commodities involved are essen-
tial for daily use. Peripheral labour is not just badly rewarded: it also is un-free. Then 
there are semi-peripheral areas which are in between the core and the periphery on 
a series of dimensions, such as the complexity of economic activities, strength of the 
state machinery, or cultural integrity. 
Quintessential for our analysis is that the core of this system laid in (shifting) 
parts of Western Europe, and from the nineteenth century onwards in Western 
Europe plus North America. There were peripheral regions in Europe, for example 
Ireland that was a periphery of Britain, or the rye-producing regions in Eastern 
Europe that fed large parts of the Dutch Republic. But most of the periphery of 
the Western core in the end would be in other continents. In the sixteenth and sev-
enteenth centuries, the Americas, and (small) parts of Africa and of Asia, formed 
Europe’s periphery. In the eighteenth century we see further extensions, in particu-
lar the parts of India that became British. At the end of that century the United 
States were no longer part of the British Empire and started shifting position in 
the global economy. Some decades later Central and South America almost in their 
entirety became independent regions, without, however, getting rid of their periph-
eral status. In the nineteenth century, with the ‘opening’ of the Ottoman Empire and 
China and, be it with differing results, Japan, and with the further exploration and 
partition of Africa, the entire world became one economic system.  
The hierarchical structure of this world-system implies that capitalism for Brau-
del and Wallerstein is not a phase in history but a layer of economic life. ‘Underde-
veloped’ regions are not in an earlier stage than ‘developed’ ones. They presuppose 
each other. The free labour one finds doing skilled work in core-areas, can not exist 
without the coerced labour used for less skilled work in the periphery. Their com-
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bination is the essence of capitalism. In this perspective, the West not only got rich 
over the back of its (semi-)peripheries, it also actively thwarted their further devel-
opment. India, to mention a notorious example, would have been ‘de-industrialized’ 
by the British. The ‘sprouts of capitalism’ that may have existed in China were either 
destroyed or distorted by foreign imperialists and their Chinese accomplices. The 
‘scramble for Africa’ in the nineteenth century only added to the damage already 
done by the enslavement of so many Africans. Latin and Central America may have 
become formally independent quite early, but they soon became parts of an infor-
mal empire run by Britain and the United States. The Ottoman Empire was slowly 
dismantled and carved up into Western zones of protection. The case of Japan was 
something of an ‘exception that proves the rule’. It never became a colony, it began 
to colonise other regions soon after it was ‘opened’, and it industrialised. 
In world-systems analysis, capitalism is the dynamic force that creates a global 
economy. The ultimate motor behind this dynamism, not unlike in many Smithian 
explanations, is supposed to be the existence from the late Middle Ages onwards 
of a Western European state-system that never turned into an empire. Fierce inter-
state-competition encouraged most states to look for expansion overseas. The ideas 
of, especially, Braudel and Wallerstein are more subtle than those of dependency 
theorists. In the last instance, however, they start from similar premises and have 
incurred similar critiques. Let us combine the critiques. There is the critique that 
the meaning of various central concepts is unclear. What exactly, for example, is 
meant by ‘unequal exchange’ and how can one measure its ‘inequality’? What is 
meant by ‘a dependent economy’ and how can one measure ‘dependency’? What 
does it take to become a centre or a periphery? Wallerstein’s concept of ‘external-
ity’ has also come in for critique. During the early modern era, China, the biggest 
economy in the world, clearly was not a periphery of Europe. Wallerstein therefore 
simply places it outside Europe’s world-system. Critics think that is Eurocentric and 
misleading. Not only was trade between China and the West, and other parts of the 
world, substantial. They also point to the fact that China exchanged manufactured 
goods like silken fabrics and porcelain, and a fairly basic product like tea, for West-
ern silver. Does not that make Europe look like a Chinese periphery?60 
The existence of a long-term deterioration of the terms of trade for the exports 
of underdeveloped countries, a fundamental ingredient in ‘the development of 
underdevelopment’, has been disputed if not actually refuted. From the third quar-
ter of the twentieth century onwards various underdeveloped, non-Western coun-
tries have known substantial economic growth. Critics regard that as a refutation of 
dependency theory. The same goes for the fact that the ‘catching up strategies’ that 
dependency theorists suggested to underdeveloped countries – in essence always 
some kind of detachment from the global market – very often failed. 
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Various economic historians, looking at the matter from a European angle, 
think that in claiming that the West developed ‘over the back’ of the rest one wildly 
overestimates the importance of contacts between the West and its peripheries for 
most of their histories.61 In a rather paradoxical way, these critics have found sup-
port amongst historians studying Asia’s history, like Gunder Frank who, after his 
converting to Asia-centrism, began to emphasize that the impact of the West on 
most parts of that continent has been quite marginal and brief. Here again one is 
confronted with the big difference in intensity, duration and impact of Western 
influence in various parts of the world. It will not be by accident that dependency 
theory originated in Latin America and was always very popular there, and in Africa. 
What, finally, has increasingly become a point of critique, is that the modern world-
systems approach would be Eurocentric in depicting a dynamic West that incorpo-
rates ever larger parts of a fairly passive, victimised ‘Rest’. 
Nevertheless, dependency theory and modern world-system analysis have 
pointed at some really major problems for neo-classical economic thinking. First 
and foremost, there is the fact that the incorporation of ever more, politically inde-
pendent, regions in a global economic network has not (yet?), as neoclassical eco-
nomics predicts, been accompanied by economic convergence. One cannot ignore 
the question to what extent the structure of international economic relations and 
exchange might be to blame for that. That question continues to hold centre stage 
in global economic history and has led to increasingly sophisticated analyses of e.g. 
slave trade and slave labour, formal and informal colonialism, commodity chains 
and the functioning of dual economies. The thesis that Europe ‘unfairly’ acquired 
a large part of its wealth elsewhere in the world, and that this would have enabled 
it to industrialise, still finds ample support in ‘textbooks’62 and in more specialised 
analyses.63
Challenges for classic Eurocentric explanations
The Smithian and Marxian master narratives about development and underdevel-
opment have their defenders until this very day. But changes in the real world and 
in the historical discipline have severely subverted their credibility. Economic trans-
formations in the Western world since the beginning of industrialization have been 
tremendous. Scale, scope and structure of business changed. Many night watch-
man-states turned into social welfare states. If their economies can still be called 
‘capitalist’, then in any case that capitalism knows many varieties.64 Classical Smi-
thian theories could no longer provide even a ‘stylized’ description of the situation 
in the West. For economic historians who believed in the Smithian perspective, this 
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presented serious challenges. Seeking comfort in further refining neo-classical mod-
els, as many economists did, to them was not really a viable option. The Marxian 
alternative, as analysis of developments in the West and as theoretical foundation of 
real-existing socialism, in the end fared even worse. The addition in the end is car-
dinal here: in the beginning of the twenty-first century one easily forgets how long 
‘socialist alternatives’ to economic liberalism looked and, to a certain extent, were 
successful in modernising countries and increasing their Gross Domestic Product. 
Whatever their merits and potential in the longer run, socialist experiments showed 
that substantial economic growth is possible in a non-capitalist setting. The fact 
that capitalism and communism not only had their problems at home, but were no 
striking successes in the Third World either, only added to the unease about these 
old paradigms. 
And then there was the challenge presented, in particular from the last decades 
of the twentieth century onwards, by various cases of sensational, non-Smithian 
and non-Marxian growth in the former ‘Third World’. Of course, there had been a 
major precedent of modern economic growth outside the West. Japan already took-
off in the Meiji Era (1868–1912). A popular strategy to deal with that ‘anomaly’ 
had always been to ‘Westernize’ it: for example, by pointing at its feudalism, at the 
competition between various fiefs during Tokugawa rule (1601–1867) that counted 
as equivalent of competition between states in Europe, or at its strong work ethic. 
The claim that industrializing Meiji Japan was a Western capitalist country that 
happened to lay in Asia nevertheless continued to be suspect. If one really wants to 
insist on seeing parallels, Germany’s industrialisation would be a case to think of, 
rather than Britain.65 Then came Japan’s phenomenal growth after World War Two. 
Again, systematic efforts to prove the opposite notwithstanding, it was clear that 
the country was not implementing Smithian, let alone, Marxian models. There was 
something peculiar and quite successful to its ‘strategy’ that was analysed in numer-
ous studies.66 When Japan’s growth figures and pace of development slackened, 
many scholars simply forgot how enthusiastic they had been about the ‘Japanese 
model’. New challenges to mainstream economics, however, would not be lacking, 
in particular with the appearance of the Asian tigers, Hong Kong, Singapore, South 
Korea and Taiwan, and from the last decades of the twentieth century onwards the 
impressive growth of China and India. Here, at least, it looked as if ‘the rise of the 
West’ was succeeded by ‘a rise of the Rest’.67
Most ‘catching up’ occurred in Asia. I personally think it would be exaggerated 
to talk about the emergence of a distinct ‘Asian’ alternative to traditional models 
of growth. But some characteristics do stand out. Firstly, there is the intervention-
ist and steering stance of governments. Chalmers Johnson, an expert in Japan’s 
history, in this respect has coined the term ‘developmental state’. In particular 
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during the first phases of economic take-off, those governments tended to behave 
quite authoritarian.68 What is also notable is the extent to which the economies 
of those new industrialising countries were export-oriented and their production 
labour-intensive. In particular this last aspect has attracted the attention of schol-
ars interested in the Great Divergence who do claim there is a distinct East Asian 
development path.69
In brief, life did not become easier for developmental economists. Their quest 
for growth proved quite elusive.70 Studies by economic historians, that became 
increasingly sophisticated and numerous, also were more helpful in deconstructing 
than in reconstructing. The idea that there would be one model of industrialization, 
even if only valid for the Western world, is no longer taken seriously, not even if one 
would take on board Gerschenkron’s (1904–1978) amendments and his functional 
equivalents.71 
The Smithian ‘rise of the market narrative’ encountered serious problems, 
without being replaced by a Marxian counterpart. There, for example, is the fact 
that industrializing Britain actually was a fiscal-military state, with high taxes and 
a huge government debt. Its central government intervened massively, directly and 
indirectly, in the economy, in particular in foreign trade. Current literature tends to 
focus much more on the importance and the (positive) effects for economic devel-
opment of Britain’s fiscal-military state and its mercantilism.72 The United States 
until well in the twentieth century actually were a bastion of protectionism. Western 
countries that successfully caught up never did so by simply copying Britain. The 
role of the state in their industrialization was substantial and pro-active. 
Moreover, changes occurred in the way in which industrialisation, especially the 
Industrial Revolution in Britain, was interpreted. In terms of an increase of GDP, 
that Revolution was anything but impressive. It apparently was a fairly regional 
affair in which the role of big factories had been overestimated. There was far more 
continuity than the word revolution suggests.73 The connection between capitalism 
and industrialisation proved to be casual rather than causal. The growth of markets 
need not and very often did not lead to industrialisation, not even in the case of 
proto-industry (sic!) that often catered for foreign markets and implied a rapid 
increase of the number of (semi)proletarians. More and more scholars in the field 
started distinguishing between Smithian growth, based on extension of the market, 
increased specialisation and division of labour, and Schumpeterian growth, based 
on organisational but most of all, technological innovation.74 Wrigley’s interpreta-
tion of the character of the industrial revolution in Britain as a transition from an 
advanced organic economy to a mineral-based fossil-fuel economy that is fairly 
contingent on the overall organisation of production and exchange, has become 
very popular, especially amongst members of the California School.75 
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Global economic history and revisionism 
The emergence of a branch of economic history that purports to be truly global and 
that seriously studies the entire globe only added to the confusion. Much more is 
becoming known about the economic history of non-Western countries. Systematic 
efforts have been and are being made to find, construct and compare data. Although 
I have been involved in this myself, I think it is only fair to point at the work of 
the Global Economic History Network and the Global Price and Income History 
Group.76 Then of course there is the work of the indefatigable Angus Maddison, 
who on a regular basis produces dense volumes filled with data, like The world econ-
omy: a millennial perspective, or Contours of the world economy, 1–2030,77 and that of 
the late Paul Bairoch (1930–1999), who actually wrote a social and economic his-
tory of the world from the sixteenth till the late twentieth century.78 We now know 
much more about incomes, prices, GDPs and standards of living of various parts of 
the world during the early modern era and the nineteenth century, which is really 
helpful when studying the Great Divergence.79 The appearance on the market of a 
new journal, the Journal of Global History, also gave a new impetus.80 All this has 
led to big changes in perspective, in particular when it comes to the early modern 
period and the history of parts of Asia.
Many economic historians now tend to ‘reorient’, as Frank puts it.81 Studies in 
which the economy of parts of Asia before the Great Divergence was presented in a 
positive light had never been lacking. In the last decades of the twentieth century, 
however, their number increased sharply. Their message, as a rule, was twofold: 
Europe had only had a marginal impact on Asia. That was even the case after the 
Great Divergence, so it now often reads. Nor was Europe more developed. Europe-
ans did not dominate Asia’s trade, let alone its production. Overall, they were not 
more advanced traders or producers. Revisionist scholars like Andre Gunder Frank, 
Kenneth Pomeranz, Roy Bin Wong, Robert Marks and Jack Goldstone, sometimes 
referred to as the ‘California School’82, in the 1990s started claiming that the most 
developed parts of Qing China, Tokugawa Japan and Mughal India were ‘advanced 
organic economies’ like Western Europe, with quite similar levels of wealth, devel-
opment and growth. They all had their periods of Smithian growth, just like they 
all, in the end, were facing Malthusian constraints. Those advanced Asian econo-
mies also had their equivalents of what in European economic history had become 
known as ‘proto-industry’, ‘industrious revolution’ or ‘consumer revolution’. What 
we are dealing with is claimed to have been a Eurasian world of ‘surprising resem-
blances’83, not a world of European exceptionalism. When it comes to all those 
specific ‘Weberian’ traits of early modern Western Europe, various scholars now 
emphatically claim that they either did not exist or were fairly irrelevant.84 Many 
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clichés with regard to ‘the East’ have been attacked. More positive descriptions of the 
economy of Tokugawa Japan had already begun to appear in the 1970s.85 The most 
striking re-evaluation, however, is that of early modern China. No expert will call it 
a case of ‘oriental despotism’ any longer. Its society under the Qing is now described 
as relatively ‘open’, with a fair amount of social mobility, and its domestic economy 
as a well-functioning market economy. The claim that its population would have 
grown unchecked is now rejected, as is the claim that its technology would be less 
developed than that of Western Europe, at least overall.86 
Many global historians now claim that the West and the Rest only began to 
diverge with industrialization in the nineteenth century. Their way of looking at it 
tends to differ from that of ‘traditional’ Smithians and Marxians. For them indus-
trialization as it occurred in the West first and foremost was a fundamental break-
through in technology and especially in energy use. As such, they do not regard it 
as a ‘logical outcome’ of the specific ‘capitalist’ institutional setting in which it hap-
pened to first occur. Even more than in the writings of various economic historians 
studying the history of the Western world, the connection between capitalism and 
industrialisation has been severed here. 
Discussing the Great Divergence
The challenge of explaining the Great Divergence in fact consists in answering four 
different questions. In terms of the economist Moses Abramovitz (1912–2000) they 
would be: Why did some countries forge ahead? And, I would add, how could their 
growth continue to be so substantial? Why and how could some countries (begin 
to) catch up? And finally, why did many countries fall behind?87 
Most scholars would agree that candidates to forge ahead via industrialization 
could only be found in Eurasia. According to Diamond, the rest of the world simply 
was less well-endowed with flora and fauna and therefore at a serious disadvantage. 
This did not prevent the emergence in Southern and Central America of various 
very highly developed societies. The ‘discovery’ of these regions by the Europeans, 
however, brought total disaster. During the colonial era some recovery occurred, but 
being colonized was not exactly a stimulus to domestic economic growth, and it left 
a legacy in the form of extractive states, landlordism and a gap between rich and 
poor that was not helpful either. The economies of North America never became as 
extractive as those in the Southern half of the continent and, in connection to that, 
a set of institutions emerged that was more supportive of growth. Interesting and 
sophisticated studies tend to now be written by economic historians like Stanley 
Engerman, Ken Sokoloff and Leandro Prados de la Escosura on the differing paths 
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of growth of the New World economies, on why and how Latin America fell behind, 
and on the role of factor endowments, institutions and colonial legacies.88 Many 
parts of Africa were not blessed by geography and did not attract settlers. Slavery 
and slave trade had negative effects on demography and on institution-building in 
terms of e.g. property rights.89 Then came colonisation and after that a decolonisa-
tion that often caused more problems than it solved.  
The main problem so becomes to explain why the West with industrialisa-
tion entered a phase of sustained and substantial economic growth, whereas large 
parts of Asia did not, or much later. Next to the traditional stories about the rise 
of the West in which it does not really matter what happened elsewhere, various 
new explanations have been offered. In the light of current revisionism in which 
the most advanced parts of Asia tend to be described as no less developed than 
Western Europe, the story of the origins of Western primacy simply had to become 
less straightforward and more contingent, emphasizing that ‘things might have 
gone differently’.90 Various new explanations have been offered, apart from the 
traditional, general explanations that of course have not simply disappeared. As we 
already indicated, Pomeranz comes with the explanation, that, in a nutshell, West-
ern Europe, or rather Britain, happened to have coal and colonies, whereas China, 
the Asian country on which he focuses, did not.91 For China’s non-industrialisation 
Gunder Frank basically sticks to the explanation that Elvin already gave in the 1970s 
when he referred to China’s ‘high-level equilibrium trap’: i.e. a situation in which 
the combination of cheap labour because of high population, expensive resources 
and scarce capital, plus very efficient markets, renders investment in labour-saving 
technology neither rational nor economical.92 He adds that in the big empires in the 
East decline had already started before Western Europe began to industrialize. This 
made it easier for Europeans to overhaul their competitors. The fact that Britain 
went for coal and machinery can simply be ‘explained’ by increasing costs of tradi-
tional energy sources and by its expensive labour. Institutions, politics and culture 
get short thrift in his last publications. Goldstone, in that respect ‘deviating’ from 
most Californians, thinks that Europe, or rather Britain, had been quite different 
from the rest of the world for quite some time already before its industrialisation 
when it comes to the development of technology and science.93
Talking about the Great Divergence in this context means talking about shifts 
in wealth, i.e. about economic phenomena. Fortunately many scholars do not lose 
sight of the very intense interconnections between what we call the economic realm 
and that of (geo-)politics, military, or, for that matter, cultural matters. To solely 
focus on ‘the economic’ would certainly be a big mistake as Findlay and O’Rourke 
nicely indicate in their book on power and plenty. It has become clear that the 
empires in the East faced big problems in all these respects. Whether they had 
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domestic origins or were caused and increased by foreign interference, they could 
lead to political crises or even (semi-)colonial situations from which the West could 
profit.94 In that respect, so it seems, the ‘Rise of the West’ was often preceded by a 
‘Decline of the East’. In particular political and military affairs should be taken on 
board here. How did Western and non-western States and empires function?95 What 
were their colonial strategies?96 How strong and efficient were their militaries?97 
The theses of the revisionists have led to fierce new debates on the causes of the 
first diverging. Studying strategies of catching up has received a new boost by the 
emergence of many successful new examples of it, especially, but not only, in Asia. 
Studying ‘the rise of the Rest’ may become something of a growth industry similar 
to what studying ‘the rise of the West’ has been for so long. This makes the fate of 
those who continue to fall behind or even become poorer more unacceptable and in 
a sense more incomprehensible, as many would claim that in a globalising economy 
it should not be hard to eradicate poverty. Abramovitz’s last question clearly has not 
yet been answered.
Economic globalization?
Most global historians focus either on comparing situations in various parts of the 
world or on connecting them. Although the bulk of this text so far has been dedi-
cated to comparative analyses, comments on the importance of global connections 
have not been lacking. A survey of the history of global economic history would 
not be complete, however, without a couple of paragraphs that explicitly deal with 
economic globalization, here defined as the increase in extensity, intensity, speed 
and impact of world-wide economic contacts. 
All developed societies in history have known long-distance trade. It has always 
received ample attention, in particular the trade that occurred in the wake of 
Europe’s expansion. Amongst scholars the question of the wider relevance of such 
trade contacts is bound to be raised. When did intercontinental economic contacts 
become really important, or as it is normally put: When did globalisation actually 
begin? Answers have varied enormously. Andre Gunder Frank and Barry Gills claim 
it already exists for 5000 years.98 Other scholars think that even in the beginning 
of the twenty-first century globalisation is more hype than reality because the so-
called ‘global economy’ essentially is nothing but the emergence of a new ‘triangular 
trade’, in this case between North America, parts of Europe and parts of Asia, with 
most of the produce of these macro-regions not being exported to other continents 
at all.99
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Amongst historians probably the most popular answer has always been to point 
at the beginning of the early modern era when Europeans discovered America and 
began to sail to Asia along Cape the Good Hope. Earlier periods have been sug-
gested, though. We already referred to the position of Gunder Frank and Barry Gills. 
Others refer to an ‘oriental globalisation’ already starting in the sixth century C.E, 
to the Islamic oecumeme of the Middle Ages, to the Pax Mongolica that paved the 
way for an interlocking set of Eurasian commercial connections in the thirteenth 
and fourteenth centuries that, according to Janet Abu-Lughod, already made up a 
world system before European hegemony.100 Critics have commented that a frail net-
work of which the Americas are not part and in which the goods traded are almost 
entirely luxuries, can hardly deserve the name ‘system’. There in any case are good 
reasons for choosing the early modern era. With the ‘discovery’ of the Americas, all 
the big continents had become known and connected. American bullion became the 
most important global ‘commodity’ and found its way into Europe, Asia and Africa. 
In 1571 with the foundation of Manila as a Spanish stronghold a direct link between 
America, Asia and Europe, and Africa, came into existence, a fact that is regarded as 
highly significant by Dennis Flynn and Arturo Giráldez.101
The triangular trade that connected Europe, Africa and the New World over the 
Atlantic grew fast, faster than any other intercontinental trade. Asian spices, textiles, 
porcelain and tea, to mention but a few goods, now began to reach Europe over 
seas. Intercontinental contacts had their impact on consumption patterns. Products 
like sugar, coffee, tea, cocoa, or tobacco became popular in many parts of the world. 
They now all have had their global history written.102 Production was also affected 
worldwide. Textiles and porcelain from Asia, for example, presented a challenge to 
European producers. The plantations in Brazil and the Caribbean provided Western 
Europe with sugar produced by slaves from Africa. Trade was indeed creating ‘a 
world’, as is shown in fascinating vignettes by Pomeranz and Topik.103 
Even bigger than that of trade was the impact of what Alfred Crosby called 
the ‘Columbian Exchange’, the transfer of flora, fauna and diseases, between the 
Old and the New Worlds.104 Then, finally, there was intercontinental movement of 
people, part ‘trade’ and part migration. Trade in this context refers to slave trade. 
By far most of the attention by scholars has always been paid to slave trade and 
slavery in the Atlantic region. Considering the numbers involved, a basic consensus 
with regard to orders of magnitude appears to have emerged. It is now commonly 
assumed that in total, i.e. for the entire duration of this ‘Western slave trade’, 
between eleven and thirteen million slaves were put on ships in Africa to cross the 
Atlantic. Between nine and a half and eleven millions of them survived transport to 
the New World.105 The total number of people involved must have been much big-
ger. Many Africans died during slave raids, during the transport to the ports where 
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they would be shipped, or while waiting there for their ships to come. If we would 
include them, Africa’s total demographic loss due to slavery – during the entire 
period of substantial slave trade, i.e. from the seventh century till 1900 – may have 
amounted to between forty and fifty-six million people. Some estimates put this 
figure much higher still.106 The impact of this demographic ‘loss’ continues to be a 
bone of contention.107 Only fairly recently have other slave trade circuits, e.g. that 
of the trans-Saharan trade eastward and that of white Christian slaves in Northern 
Africa, become subject of serious analysis.108 That also applies to other un-free 
labour like that of convicts, and the semi-free labour of indentured labourers.109 
Intercontinental free migration was still relatively insignificant in the early modern 
era. From Europe, by far the biggest exporter of people to other continents, over the 
entire era not more than some five million people migrated overseas. 
Europe was the only continent with direct contacts to all other continents. That 
does not mean it would have been the only region with substantial long-distance 
trade. There were other big trading areas, at times encompassing parts of various 
continents and sometimes of a scale, e.g. in case of the Indian Ocean or the Chinese 
Seas, that dwarfed what was going on in Europe. As a rule, these areas were located 
around a sea. Studying such ‘seascapes’ and their hinterlands, like the Mediterra-
nean, the Indian Ocean, the Arabian Seas, increasingly also the Pacific Ocean, whose 
importance as a trade route tends to be re-interpreted, and of course the Atlantic 
Ocean, has become very popular.110 A caveat is in order here. From a West European 
perspective the early modern era clearly was an era of increasing (intercontinental) 
trade. One must, however, not forget that during that period certain kinds of trade 
and the trade activities of certain regions decreased rather than increased. Overland 
trade between Europe and Asia tended to decline over time, as did African caravan 
trade. Large parts of the Mediterranean and of Central Europe did not share in the 
new dynamism of the Atlantic region, far from. China at times closed itself off for 
foreign trade, especially with Europeans. Japan and Korea did so too, and much 
more radically. Intercontinental trade had its booms and busts, the most famous 
example for the early modern period being the crisis of the seventeenth century 
that, according to various scholars, was a truly global economic crisis.111 Not every-
one agreed. Which only further fuelled the debate on how to actually prove the 
existence of world-wide economic conjunctures, in this case in levels of trade or 
prices and on how to explain them.112 Their existence might be a good indicator of 
globalisation. Most experts would agree that from the nineteenth century onwards 
one indeed can discern world-wide economic fluctuations of various lengths and 
intensity and worldwide interconnections in the movement of basic economic vari-
ables. Agreement on their exact nature and causes is still lacking. For earlier periods 
uncertainties and disagreements are even bigger. What is clear is that not only the 
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timing but also the impact of globalisation differed widely: global trends that hardly 
touched some regions might have an enormous impact in others. Nor can it be 
doubted that for colonised regions globalisation already became an unmistakable 
fact of life quite some time ago. 
The claim that economic globalisation really took off with Columbus has been 
fiercely contested, especially by Jeffrey Williamson and Kevin O’Rourke.113 Accord-
ing to them it only started in the 1820s, when markets integrated worldwide and 
global convergence of prices set in. Until then, intercontinental trade, in their view 
predominantly in (semi-)luxurious goods, would not have entailed fundamental 
shifts in sites and modes of production. They claim better means of transport and 
communication, rising incomes, and the disappearance of many of the barriers 
to free trade were the heralds of an unprecedented economic integration over the 
nineteenth century. What they actually describe, is the emergence of an integrated 
Atlantic economy with intense movement of commodities, capital and people, while 
the rest of the world was connected to that system but not yet fully incorporated in 
it.114 Fascinatingly enough the nineteenth century on a global scale witnessed an 
increasing economic integration as well as an increasing economic inequality, and 
so like in many current debates elicits the still hotly debated question: Does global-
ization make the world more unequal?115 Fortunately enough there now in any case 
is an excellent book by Findlay and O’Rourke that covers global trade over the entire 
second millennium, so that one can at least try and systematically discuss the ques-
tions at hand.116 The story of the huge increase in transatlantic migration of free 
people during the long nineteenth century till World War I, that of course is integral 
to this process of globalisation, has been told many times. It is only thanks to the 
further growth of the discipline of global history that the huge migration from but 
especially inside Asia now also receives the attention it deserves.117 
Economic globalisation in modern times has not been a unilinear process 
either. In the period between the two world wars, the level of intercontinental 
and even international economic exchange lessened. That tide turned again after 
1945, with a clear acceleration after 1973 when exchange rates became free. In the 
1980s, according to probably the biggest bestseller ever on globalization, a book by 
Thomas Friedman, the world became flat, and, with the fall of ‘communism’ and 
the appearance of various new industrializing countries, also one.118 Economic glo-
balisation then not only made a quantitative leap forward, it also changed character. 
The importance of international financial transactions increased phenomenally, 
to which the revolution in information and communication technology will not 
have been innocent. The same applies to the role of services in international trade. 
Foreign direct investments reached unprecedented levels and multinational firms 
became powerful global players. As indicated, not all experts would agree with the 
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one-flat-world-thesis, pointing at the fact that in the beginning of the twenty-first 
century most countries still tend to trade predominantly with their neighbours and 
that only a certain number of trade blocs really go global. They do have a point, but 
even so two conclusions stand out. There definitely has been an increase in scale 
of trade networks, with trade-blocks increasingly functioning like states used to in 
the past, and between the major of these trade blocks intercontinental connections 
do increase and get tidier. In that process transcontinental migration also is on the 
increase, although as compared to commodities and capital, let alone information, 
people still are rather immobile. 
One needs no specific practical reason to globalise economic history. On the con-
trary: what good intellectual reasons could there be to not try and compare eco-
nomic developments in various parts of the world or to not study the connections 
that may have existed between them? The fact that the world, as the cliché has it, is 
becoming a small place, only gives extra practical urgency to those endeavours. Not 
by accident the XVth World Economic History Conference of 2009 will be dedicated 
to global economic history. The importance of knowing about other economic sys-
tems and their histories and about potentialities and pitfalls of economic globaliza-
tion will only increase. Historians as a rule are weary of making predictions and are 
probably correct in that. I would, however, be surprised if the discipline of global 
economic history would not have a bright future.  
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